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1.  Introduction  
The aim of this paper is to make a first step towards studying the role of social expenditure and 
its interaction with corporate taxation in determining the destination of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows.  
 Multinational enterprises (MNEs) play an increasingly dominant role in the international 
economy and considerable effort has been devoted in recent years to the study of the 
determinants of their location and investment decisions.  Developments in imperfect competition 
theory have made it possible to depart from a treatment of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows 
as portfolio capital flows that characterised much of the economics literature up until the early 
1980s; multinational firms’ behaviour is now usually analysed within imperfectly competitive 
general equilibrium or industrial organisation models of trade.  A ‘unified’ framework for the 
positive theory of FDI has emerged that highlights the role of market access, trade and factor 
costs, factor endowments and scale economies in determining the locational choices of MNEs 
and the clear testable predictions emerging from this body of theoretical literature have found 
good support in the empirical analysis.1   
 Whilst the positive theory of FDI has made incredible leaps forward, much of the public 
debate surrounding MNEs has focused on the policy determinants of their location decisions.  In 
this area, the progress in the academic literature – both at a theoretical and at an empirical level – 
has not been as significant and has to a great extent focussed on the role of taxation.  Corporate 
taxes, in particular, are considered as having adverse effects on the volume and location of FDI 
since, other things equal, they reduce after-tax returns from investment.  In line with the 
traditional theory of tax competition2, this view suggests that increasingly footloose firms and 
industries − that have the ability to shift taxable income between jurisdictions in response to 
different tax treatments − will (i) channel investment towards countries with lower relative 
corporate taxes, and hence (ii) lead to a downward convergence of capital taxation, as 
governments compete with each other in the attempt to attract and/or retain industry.   The 
resulting shrinking of actual and potential tax revenues is then likely to undermine governments’ 
ability to finance expenditure, thus leading to a downward convergence of national policies 
towards lower levels of taxation, smaller governments and welfare state programmes, and lower 
levels of regulations and social standards.  This view is at the core of the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ 
                                                 
1  For an excellent synthesis of this literature, see Markusen (2002) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).  
2  For a survey, see Wilson (1999). 
 2
hypothesis that informs much of the current debate on globalisation, and of concerns about 
‘harmful’ competition between governments that underpin calls, in recent years, for 
‘harmonisation’ of tax polices – for example by the OECD (1998) and the EU (1999).3  
 The findings of a large part of the existing empirical literature on the effects of taxation 
on FDI seem to support the view that international differences in corporate taxation are important 
determinants of the location decisions of MNEs.  Desai et al. (2002) examine the link between 
taxation and foreign direct investment using affiliate-level data for US companies investing 
abroad over the period 1982 to 1997 and find a strong negative effect of taxation in the host 
country on investment by foreign affiliates.  Further empirical evidence on the deterring effect of 
corporation taxes on the attraction of FDI is presented by Gropp and Kostial (2000) who focus 
on total FDI inflows and outflows; Grubert and Mutti (2000), Altshuler et al. (2001) and Görg 
(2005) who concentrate on the location decisions of US firms; and Hines (1996) who studies the 
location of foreign multinationals across US states.4   
 There are, however, major stylized facts concerning the effects of ‘globalisation’ on 
national economies that call for further inquiry into these issues.  There is no compelling 
evidence to date of a race-to-the-bottom among industrial economies and substantial cross-
country diversity remains in government spending, transfers and taxation. Welfare state reforms 
in OECD countries have mostly been limited to a restructuring of expenditure that has not 
resulted in substantial retrenchments.5  As documented by a recent OECD report (OECD, 2006), 
tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are on the rise in many OECD countries.  Existing evidence 
also casts doubts on the extent of competition between governments in capital taxation, as 
overall effective corporate tax burdens do not appear to have fallen in response to capital and 
trade liberalisation: whilst many governments have reduced statutory corporate income tax rates, 
most have simultaneously broadened the tax base and closed various loopholes (Devereux et al., 
2002), so that total revenue from capital taxation has not declined. More generally, inter-country 
differences in corporate tax treatments remain very large.  
 These stylised facts suggest that national governments have thus far retained significant 
control over their policies.  To paraphrase Rodrik (1997), one interpretation of this is that 
                                                 
3  Consistent with this view, the traditional theory on tax competition predicts that in open economies with full 
capital mobility, capital taxation should tend to zero as the tax burden is transferred on to immobile factors (for a 
survey, see Wilson, 1999).   
4  Hines (1999) and Gordon and Hines (2002) provide extensive reviews of the evidence on corporate tax and FDI.  
5  For example, Dreher (2006) finds that globalisation, measured by an index encompassing 23 variables, did not 
‘decrease leeway for independent national economic policy’.   
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economic globalisation has not yet gone far enough. Another, and intellectually more intriguing, 
hypothesis is that the revenue raising ability of governments is not fundamentally hindered by 
economic globalisation.6   More specifically, the above stylised facts can be taken as casting 
doubts on the extent to which governments’ accountability has become biased towards external 
economic agents.  This in turn may suggest that the current literature on tax-competition and FDI 
overstates the degree to which international investment decisions are driven by relative tax-
treatment considerations. 
 There are a number of reasons to suppose that MNEs’ location decisions may not be as 
sensitive to corporate tax differentials as is often presumed.   In terms of behavioural responses 
to corporate taxation, multinational firms have the ability to shift profits to lower-tax locations – 
for example via transfer pricing or intra-firm debt contracting.  Governments that are imposing 
high tax rates may also set in place mechanisms that compensate firms indirectly via other 
investment incentives.  Furthermore, as emerges from the recent positive theory of foreign direct 
investment, taxation is only one of the many factors that determine the international location of 
firms: other cost and/or market access considerations may be as important.  In particular, 
corporate taxation per se may be expected to play a more limited role in FDI decisions among 
high-income industrial economies, characterised by significant two-way inter-industry FDI 
flows, where ‘horizontal’ integration appears to be the most dominant motivation for FDI.7  The 
complexity and number of factors that drive MNEs’ decisions may thus be expected to soften 
significantly the effects of taxation on FDI8 and can help explain the persistence of wide 
corporate tax differentials between countries. For example, in the presence of imperfect 
competition, agglomeration economies have been shown to generate rents for the mobile factors 
that can be partially appropriated by governments via taxation.9 These agglomeration forces 
result in equilibria characterised by differential rates of capital taxation, with regions with a 
higher concentration of industries being able to charge a higher tax rate without losing capital. 
                                                 
6  Molana and Montagna (2006), in a theoretical model with aggregate scale economies, show how welfare state 
policies can interact with international trade and capital mobility in increasing aggregate welfare.   
7  An important distinction that has emerged from the literature is that between ‘vertical’ and horizontal FDI: 
‘horizontal’ FDI (in which MNEs duplicate production operations abroad) is driven primarily by market access 
considerations, whilst ‘vertical’ FDI emerges from vertical fragmentation of production and differences in skill-
labour intensities and is therefore driven by cost and factor endowment considerations. Focusing on US MNEs, 
Mutti and Grubert (2004) find that horizontal FDI is less sensitive than vertical FDI to host country taxation.  
8  Markusen (1995) predicts the effects of taxation to be unnoticeable as a result of these other factors.  
9  See for instance, Ludema and Wooton (2000), Andersson and Forslid (2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004).  
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 More fundamentally, what these recent theoretical developments do is to critically 
challenge the focus of standard tax competition literature on ‘perfect markets’, where investment 
can move ‘frictionlessly’ across national borders.  When investing abroad, firms respond to 
‘imperfect markets’10 and are not driven solely by the search for higher net-of-tax returns. FDI 
flows, while relatively liquid ex-ante, are characterised by significant immobility ex-post, thus 
entailing a long-lasting ownership stake in a host country.  This in turn implies that, in addition 
to factors such as the ‘thickness’ of supplier markets, the cost and quality of local inputs, and the 
proximity and size of final markets, firms’ perceptions about the host country’s economic and 
social environment are key to their choice of location, and investment decisions will depend on 
the combination of taxation and the provision of public goods and services that host countries 
can offer because of taxation.11   It is therefore plausible to conjecture that an ‘unfavourable’ tax 
differential may even be associated with more and not less investment flowing into a country, if 
higher taxes are associated with other long-lasting favourable conditions such as legal and labour 
market institutions, public services, and public capital that improve the business environment.12   
 It is often alleged that the categories of expenditure that matter to investors in Tiebout-
type of ‘public good/taxation’ combinations are ‘productive’ expenditure, such as public 
investment in infrastructure.  Indeed, the recent attacks on the modern welfare states are partly 
based on the supposition that social policy has highly distortionary effects on incentives and is 
thus expected, other things equal, to act as a hindrance to a country’s ability to attract and/or 
retain industry.  Yet, casual evidence suggests that social infrastructure is very important in 
attracting inward investment.13 
 Set against the above background, in this paper we make an empirical attempt in 
exploring the proposition that redistributive social welfare state policies are valued by 
multinationals – since, for instance, they result in higher social contentment and stability.  In a 
recent survey14 of multinationals, a ‘stable social and political environment’ was found to be the 
second most important − ‘very influential’ − factor (after market access and before the quality of 
infrastructures and quality of skilled staff) in determining the attractiveness of an investment 
                                                 
10  This was already pointed out in the ‘early’ literature on FDI: e.g., see Hymer (1976), Caves (1971) and Dunning 
(1971). 
11  This idea dates back to Tiebout (1956). 
12  Political scientists have recently examined the role of ‘market-friendly’ political institutions and policies in 
determining FDI flows. See for instance Mosley (2003) and Jensen (2006). 
13  Markusen (2001) includes in this definition physical, educational and legal infrastructure. 
14  The survey was carried out by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and Deloitte & Touche. See Jensen 
(2006). 
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location. Hence, to the extent that social policy plays an important role in signalling a 
government’s commitment to social stability, it may attract FDI.  Using panel data for 18 high-
income OECD countries and measuring the extent of social welfare policies by the (public social 
expenditure)/GDP ratio, we investigate whether the latter exerts any significant impact on FDI 
inflows − once all other determinants are accounted for − and find strong support for the above 
proposition.  We explain our empirical work and provide the estimation results in Section 2 and 
give our concluding remarks in Section 3.  
 
 
2.  Estimating the Impact of Social Expenditure on FDI  
As explained above, our main theoretical conjecture is that social welfare state policies play a 
positive role in attracting FDI.  Thus, while we maintain that multinationals do care about the tax 
rates imposed by the host countries, we suggest that they are also concerned about those host 
governments’ policies which affect the socio-economic environment in which they will be 
operating. 
 We therefore propose to start our empirical analysis by estimating an equation which, in 
addition to the other typical explanatory variables, uses the relevant proxies for taxation and 
social expenditure, and the interaction between them, as the main regressors determining the 
inflow of FDI.  More specifically, let the general regression equation be   
 ( )it it it it it it ity x z x z wα β γ δ ε′= + + ⋅ + + , (1) 
where, for a host country i in year t, ity  is the (logarithm of real) inflow of FDI;  itx  is the share 
of social expenditure in GDP;  itz  is the effective marginal tax rate
15; and itw  is a vector of the 
conditioning variables that are usually used is the literature.16 Social expenditure refers to the 
                                                 
15  The economics literature distinguishes between two slightly different concepts of the effective tax rate: the 
effective marginal (EMTR) and effective average (EATR) tax rates.  When it comes to examining the effects of 
corporate tax rates on the activities of MNEs, Devereux et al. (2002) argue that the EATR is the relevant tax rate 
in determining discrete investment choices (i.e., whether to invest or export) as the average return to capital is 
what matters for this decision.  By contrast, the EMTR is relevant for firms’ decisions about the level of 
investment, as it affects the net marginal return to capital.  Hence, the use of the EMTR seems appropriate in our 
context.  However, it should also be noted that while we have some data on EATR the coverage is by no means 
as extensive as for the EMTR and the use of the former would hence limit our analysis severely.  Still, we find 
that for those cases for which we have both EATR and EMTR, these two rates are highly positively correlated.   
16  See Blonigen (2005) for a recent survey on the determinants of FDI flows.   
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bulk of what is normally defined as the welfare state, i.e. publicly financed health and social 
protection.17  In this study, the main control variables that we include in this vector are18:  
 
1. The logarithms of real GDP and population (GDP and POP). Together, these capture the 
market size of the host country which is important for market-seeking MNEs. We would 
therefore expect FDI to be positively affected by these variables.  
2. Unit labour cost and the cost of capital (ULC and CC) capture cost and relative factor 
endowment considerations and are expected to have a negative effect on inward FDI.  
3. A measure of openness (OPEN, measured by trade/GDP ratio) is used as a proxy for trade 
barriers and trade costs.  While this measure is likely to influence FDI, its effect is a priori 
ambiguous and will ultimately depend on whether FDI is a complement or a substitute to 
trade: countries with a higher trade openness should be more attractive to export-seeking 
MNEs, whilst low barriers to trade may reduce the attractiveness of horizontal, market-
seeking, FDI.     
4. The real effective exchange rate (REER, defined such that an increase is depreciation). The 
effect of this variable is a priori ambiguous. As a measure of the competitiveness of the host 
country, which may matter particularly for export-platform FDI, it is expected to have a 
positive effect on FDI.  However, to the extent that a weak currency reduces the value of an 
investment and of repatriated profits, then an increase in REER should deter FDI.  
5. A number of ‘policy’ variables: the share of public consumption in GDP (GC); an index of 
infrastructure (INFRA); and inflation (INF).  These are relevant if we believe that MNEs are 
ceteris paribus likely to favour locations that offer a market-friendly and stable 
macroeconomic environment.19 GC captures the size of the government and since, other things 
equal, MNEs are likely to prefer ‘leaner’ governments, we would expect GC to have a 
negative effect on FDI.  Similarly, a high inflation could reflect a ‘wet’ government and we 
would expect INFL to have a negative effect on inward FDI.  In contrast, INFRA is expected 
to have a positive impact on inward FDI since it facilitates operations. 
                                                 
17  The latter includes expenditure on: active labour market policies; disability and family cash benefits, family 
services, housing, occupational injury, old age cash benefits, other contingencies, services for elderly and 
disabled, sickness benefits, survivors, unemployment benefits. 
18  See the data appendix for all definitions.  
19  Mosley (2003) argues that for industrial economies in particular, international financial markets participants are 
particularly sensitive to key macroeconomic indicators. 
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6. An index of left-political party (LEFT): one the one hand, one may expect this to have a 
negative effect on FDI as it indicates a commitment to a more interventionist and 
redistributive style of government in the economy; on the other hand, as in the Scandinavian 
corporatist system, left governments may be allied with encompassing labour movements and 
this may be attractive to FDI by generating social stability and containment of wage demands.  
7. We also condition our regression on the lagged dependent variable, 1ity − .  Past FDI inflows are 
important in that they signal to investors about both the business environment and the extent 
of the market, and thus serve as a control for the ‘self-perpetrating’ nature of FDI.  In addition, 
we include a constant intercept, country fixed effects, and time trend (TREND) to pick up any 
trend discrepancies that are not captured by the regressors.20  Finally, itε  in (1) is a zero-mean 
random disturbance term reflecting all unobservable shocks and model omissions.  
 The specification of equation (1) captures our theoretical belief regarding the role of 
taxation and its use discussed above in that, by allowing for an interaction effect between the 
effective marginal tax rate and social expenditure, the impact of each of these variables on FDI 
inflow depends on the other variable. In particular, we postulate that α>0 since we expect social 
expenditure to stimulate FDI inflows. However, because it it
it
y z
x
α γ∂ = +
∂
, the total effect of social 
expenditure on FDI depends on its interaction with capital taxation.  It is plausible to expect the 
positive impact of social expenditure to be lower the higher is the burden of taxation, i.e., γ <0 
and hence 0it
it
y
x
∂
≤
∂
 cannot be ruled out a priori.  Alternatively, of course, one may focus on the 
overall impact of taxation on FDI by examining it it
it
y x
z
β γ∂ = +
∂
, which would normally be 
expected to be negative.  However, given our theoretical priors, we would not rule out that the 
overall impact of corporate taxes may turn out to be insignificant or even positive.  
 We carry out our empirical investigation using a panel dataset consisting of annual 
observations over the period 1984–1998 for the following 18 OECD countries: Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. Table 1 reports the estimates of 
the general specification in equation (1), where we have also included as an additional regressor 
                                                 
20  We also experimented with time dummies, but the time trend seems to yield better results.  
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the interaction term between the tax rate and government consumption, itz  and GCit, in order to 
capture any interdependence between their impacts.  Briefly, the estimates suggest: 
? Social expenditure, the tax rate and their interaction, ( )it it it itx z x zα β γ+ + ⋅ , play a 
significant role in explaining the inflow of FDI and we obtain  ˆˆ ˆ0; 0; 0α β γ> > < , where 
ˆˆ ˆ, andα β γ  are the estimated values of the corresponding parameters.  
? α >0 conforms to our hypothesis that social expenditure can attract FDI inflows. Social 
expenditure is normally regarded as an ‘unproductive’ category of expenditure which 
hinders the attractiveness of a location to foreign investors via its distortionary effects on 
the economy and by increasing governments’ revenue raising needs.  However, as 
pointed out earlier, social expenditure is also likely to play an important role in signalling 
a government’s commitment to social stability, as it contributes amongst other things to 
(i) developing and maintaining a social fabric, (ii) reducing political unrest, (iii) 
warranting unions’ cooperation, (iv) increasing workers incentive to invest in industry- 
and/or firm-specific training, and (v) increasing education and health standards.   
? β >0 goes against the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and hence may appear 
counterintuitive. Nevertheless, it is fully consistent with the view that MNEs’ major 
concern is not with taxation but with what governments do with it and is therefore in line 
with our conjecture that capital taxation should not necessarily discourage FDI.   
? γ <0 suggests that the higher is the level of social expenditure (taxation) the lower is going 
to be the overall impact of taxation (social expenditure) on FDI:  for sufficiently high 
levels of social expenditure (taxation), the overall effect of taxation (expenditure) on FDI 
may become negative.  Or, put differently, at sufficiently low levels of social expenditure 
(taxation), high levels of taxation (social expenditure) encourage FDI, while the opposite 
will happen when social expenditure (taxation) is sufficiently high.  This type of 
behaviour may reflect a fear by investors that too high levels of social expenditure (or 
taxation) indicate a convergence to (i) a large government size, and/or (ii) welfare policies 
that are sufficiently generous so as to generate disincentive effects on economic behaviour 
– e.g. on labour supply, saving, etc.  
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? The market size factors, GDP and population, have the expected positive impacts although 
the latter’s coefficient is statistically insignificant. It is worth noting that because we are not 
particularly interested in measuring the impact of these variables individually, we have 
entered them without any restrictions as, say, 1 2ln lnit itGDP POPδ δ+ . It may be more 
appropriate to use per capita GDP in this context but this can be obtained by simply 
reparameterising the former expression as ( ) ( )1 2 1ln / lnit it itGDP POP POPδ δ δ+ −  which does 
not change.  
? The coefficients of lagged FDI, real effective exchange rate, infrastructure and openness have 
the expected sign and are statistically significant; although those of infrastructure and 
openness are only significant at a lower confidence level, we shall retain these explanatory 
variables at this stage. The coefficients of government consumption and its interaction with 
the tax rate, inflation, unit labour costs, cost of capital and the index of left-political party are 
all statistically insignificant and we shall drop these explanatory variables. These finding are 
on the whole consistent with those reported in literature. 
 On the whole, the results so far lend support to our conjecture about the effects of social 
expenditure and corporate taxation on FDI and thus cast doubts on the race-to-the-bottom 
hypothesis.  In light of the above analysis, and in the interest of statistical efficiency, in 
investigating the role of social expenditure in determining inward FDI, we need to obtain a more 
parsimonious specification which passes the required robustness checks.  The first step therefore 
is to exclude the explanatory variables whose coefficients were insignificant and re-estimate the 
corresponding restricted specification.  This is also reported in Table 1; the coefficient estimates 
of the remaining explanatory variables are not affected by imposing this restriction (i.e. dropping 
the insignificant explanatory variables) and the F test supports the underlying joint restriction.  
However, a further examination of the coefficient estimates of the restricted specification 
suggests that the impacts of infrastructure and openness are not clearly identified since the 
significance of the coefficient of INFRA drops and in fact neither variable seems to have a 
significant impact at a satisfactory confidence level. Given that the sample pair-wise cross-
section correlation coefficients between INFRA and OPEN are very high, this result is likely to 
be due to multicollinearity.  
 We therefore report in Table 2 the estimates of the alternative specifications by dropping 
one of these variables − INFRA and OPEN − at a time from the restricted specification reported 
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in Table 1.  Given that these alternative models are non-nested, we also report in Table 2 the 
statistics for comparing these specifications – see in particular the JA statistics and the 
information criteria, IC.  While it seems reasonable to regard these models as equally good 
alternatives, we find Model 1 which uses OPEN to be superior; the coefficient of OPEN is 
highly significant − in comparison to the coefficient of INFRA in Model 2 − and the time trend 
also features significantly in Model 1 (we had to retain the time trend in Model 2, despite its 
insignificant coefficient, in order to remove the trend that was not captured otherwise and was 
reflected in the residuals). Given that the sample consists of high-income OECD countries, all 
with high levels and quality of infrastructures, the finding is perhaps not surprising.  
 While past FDI continues to play an important (and rather stable) explanatory role in both 
specifications, we still need to examine the residuals to see if they pick up any omitted dynamics 
which could manifest themselves in residual autocorrelation. We therefore re-estimated both 
models again allowing for AR(1) disturbances. The results are reported in Table 3 and show no 
sign of omitted dynamics/residual autocorrelation.  
 So far, we have been estimating our models using least squares on the grounds that all the 
explanatory variables can be regarded as weakly exogenous. However, given that there is the 
possibility that governments may use the tax rate as a policy variable to attract FDI, we need to 
allow for simultaneity between the tax rate and the inward FDI.  In Table 4, we report the two-
stage least squares estimates of the two models that treat the tax rate as an endogenous 
explanatory variable.  These estimates are not very different from the least square ones reported 
in Table 2 and the Wu–Hausman test statistic reported in the table does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the tax rate is weakly exogenous.  
 In the light of the above explanations, we chose Model 1 as our preferred specification 
and use its least squares estimates reported in Table 2 to analyse the net impacts of social 
expenditure and capital taxation on FDI inflows.  Using the sample information, for each country 
i we measure these by  
?
ˆ ˆi i
i
y z
x
α γ∂ = +
∂
  and 
?
ˆ ˆi i
i
y x
z
β γ∂ = +
∂
 where ix  and iz  are the mean values of 
itx  and itz  over the estimation period 1984–1998.  Table 5 reports these values as well as the test 
statistics for the null hypotheses 0ixβ γ+ =  and 0izα γ+ = , both individually and jointly.  
 As the last row of Table 5 shows, the full sample indicates that the overall impact of 
social expenditure is positive while that of taxation is negative; we find that ˆ ˆ 0zα γ+ >   and  
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ˆ ˆ 0xβ γ+ <  (and both are statistically significant at rather high confidence levels) where x  and 
z  are the mean values of itx  and itz  over the whole sample.  At the individual country level, this 
result also holds for Australia, Canada, Japan, Portugal, and USA. For Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, New Zealand and Spain we find the overall impact of taxation to be 
negative and statistically significant but cannot reject the hypothesis that social expenditure does 
not have a net effect on inward FDI, i.e., ˆ ˆ 0izα γ+ = ; hence, for these countries the tax rates are 
sufficiently high on average to compensate the direct impact of social expenditure, while 
ˆ ˆ 0ixβ γ+ <  still holds.  In contrast, there seems to be no net impact from either taxation or social 
expenditure on the inflow of FDI into Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland and UK, i.e., 
ˆ ˆ 0izα γ+ =  and ˆ ˆ 0ixβ γ+ = ; in these countries social expenditure and the tax rate are relatively 
high on average and compensate the corresponding direct impacts.   
 The only anomalies are the results for Ireland and Sweden: in Ireland, social expenditure 
is ineffective while taxation has a positive net impact on inward FDI; in Sweden, both effects are 
significant but have the opposite sign to that we expected a priori. However, Ireland and Sweden 
are usually used as special examples in the literature of successful economies in, respectively, 
attracting inward FDI and achieving high levels of social standards and may, therefore, be 
somewhat regarded as ‘outliers’ in our sample.  
 On the whole, however, the evidence reported above encourages a more substantial 
empirical pursuit of the possibility that MNEs do not only take account of the levels of taxation 
in the host countries but also care about what governments do with the resulting tax revenue.  
 
 
3.  Conclusions  
This paper offers a first exploration of the effects of social expenditure and its interaction with 
levels of corporate taxation on foreign direct investment.  In our empirical analysis, based on data 
from 18 OECD countries for the period 1984-1998, we find strong support for our conjecture that 
redistributive social welfare state policies are valued by multinationals.   
 At first sight, our results may be startling and appear as being counterintuitive. A key 
tenant of the conventional wisdom on the effects of globalisation is that capital mobility 
undermines the revenue raising and hence spending capacity of governments, as firms have a 
strong preference for locations with relatively low taxation.  Our analysis, instead, suggests that 
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competition between governments for internationally mobile firms may be more muted than what 
is implied by the tax-competition (and race-to-the bottom) hypothesis and confirms our 
conjecture that corporate taxation does not necessarily deter FDI, if it is associated with the 
provision of public goods that improve the economic environment in which MNEs operate.  
Thus, so long as there is diversity in the combination of programmes that may be of interest to 
MNEs, a convergence of taxation regimes is not to be expected as a result of the increase in 
capital mobility.   
 This study highlights the overall empirical relationship between social policy, and its 
interaction with corporate taxation, and FDI.  However, it only offers conjectures as to the 
reasons behind this relationship. An interesting direction of future research will be to consider 
the effects of specific categories of social expenditure on FDI as well as to identify the channels 
and mechanisms through which these effects take place.  
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Table 1.  Panel least squares estimates of the general specification 
Dependent variable is logarithm of real FDI inflow, ity  
 General Specification Restricted Specification 
Regressor Coeff. Estimate t-ratio Coeff. Estimate t-ratio 
itx  0.180698 3.377216 0.156709 4.214143 
itz  0.140464 2.870871 0.156168 4.271028 
it itx z⋅  -0.007176 -3.726300 -0.006255 -4.332907 
lnGDPit 1.177806 3.962402 1.181546 4.186456 
lnPOPit 1.022771 0.467332 -- -- 
GCit -0.051971 -0.601324 -- -- 
GCit itz⋅  0.001345 0.396171 -- -- 
INFRAit 0.034825 1.629404 0.031405 1.491196 
OPENit 0.227206 1.562018 0.226738 1.689263 
REERit -0.010410 -2.915769 -0.009367 -4.177137 
INFLit -0.010241 -0.582105 -- -- 
ULCit 9.49E-06 0.476907 -- -- 
CCit 0.182301 1.239393 -- -- 
LEFTCit 0.000441 0.494227 -- -- 
1ity −  0.281800 3.520728 0.286925 3.498031 
TREND -0.021949 -0.532833 -0.010864 -0.313463 
Constant Intercept 4.471019 0.060554 0.204507 0.002990 
2R  0.91239  0.9140  
S.E. of regression 0.43898  0.43469  
RSS 45.4785  45.9163  
Log-likelihood -142.6537  -143.9473  
Durbin-Watson 2.026  2.036  
Akaike IC 1.30855  1.26628  
Schwarz IC 1.76168  1.62612  
F(7,236) 
p-Value 
0.3246 
(0.942388) 
   
• t-ratios are based on White cross-section standard errors.  
• Country fixed effect estimates are not reported.  
• RSS is the sum of squared residuals. 
• The F ratio in the last row is for the joint restrictions due to excluding the regressors.  
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 Table 2.  Panel least squares estimates of two alternative specifications 
Dependent variable is logarithm of real FDI inflow, ity  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Regressor Coeff. Estimate t-ratio Coeff. Estimate t-ratio 
itx  0.125909 3.158686 0.151940 4.179063 
itz  0.125323 3.380606 0.156620 4.354771 
it itx z⋅  -0.005090 -3.413753 -0.006303 -4.446734 
lnGDPit 1.098153 3.512078 1.167136 4.164059 
INFRAit  -- -- 0.036272 1.761867 
OPENit 0.359722 3.052397 -- -- 
REERit -0.008014 -3.120315 -0.010979 -4.868471 
1ity −  0.295143 3.494371 0.286245 3.511905 
TREND 0.046712 2.062170 -0.009435 -0.270018 
Constant Intercept -109.5225 -2.776858 -1.998643 -0.028995 
2R  0.912645  0.913969  
S.E. of regression 0.438338  0.435003  
RSS 46.88225  46.17161  
Log-likelihood -146.7577  -144.6957  
Durbin-Watson 1.998906  2.031917  
Akaike IC 1.279687  1.264413  
Schwarz IC 1.626202  1.610928  
JA Statistic 
p-Value 
1.491196 
(0.1372) 
 
1.689263 
(0.0925) 
 
• t-ratios are based on White cross-section standard errors.  
• Country fixed effect estimates are not reported.  
• RSS is the sum of squared residuals. 
• The JA Statistic is Davidson and MacKinon’s non-nested test statistic for Model 1 v Model 2 or vice 
versa, and is distributed as standard normal asymptotically. 
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Table 3.  Panel least squares estimates with AR(1) disturbances  
Dependent variable is logarithm of real FDI inflow, ity  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Regressor Coeff. Estimate t-ratio Coeff. Estimate t-ratio 
itx  0.122881 2.991793 0.150410 3.937498 
itz  0.122268 3.248941 0.155028 4.246154 
it itx z⋅  -0.004951 -3.284200 -0.006235 -4.373752 
lnGDPit 1.018425 3.253436 1.138781 3.889643 
INFRAit  -- -- 0.035510 1.682386 
OPENit 0.352055 2.933722 -- -- 
REERit -0.007562 -2.969002 -0.010816 -4.654421 
1ity −  0.354853 3.083046 0.308816 2.650459 
TREND 0.041103 1.783364 -0.010200 -0.298807 
Constant Intercept -97.51318 -2.378010 -0.138367 -0.002053 
AR(1) coefficient -0.070873 -0.530486 -0.026314 -0.196472 
2R  0.912352  0.913624  
S.E. of regression 0.439075  0.435877  
RSS 46.84711  46.16717  
Log-likelihood -146.6565  -144.6827  
Durbin-Watson 1.980099  2.024355  
• t-ratios are based on White cross-section standard errors.  
• Country fixed effect estimates are not reported.  
• RSS is the sum of squared residuals.  
• Panel two-stage estimation (with lagged dependent variable and regressors used as instruments) 
yielded similar results.  
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Table 4.  Panel two-stage least squares estimates 
(effective tax rate, itz , treated as endogenous)  
Dependent variable is logarithm of real FDI inflow, ity  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Regressor Coeff. Estimate t-ratio Coeff. Estimate t-ratio 
itx  0.145535 2.472012 0.249342 2.779958 
itz  0.143675 2.197632 0.263463 2.462476 
it itx z⋅  -0.005843 -2.501190 -0.010151 -2.731665 
lnGDPit 1.107767 3.501443 1.191927 4.679895 
INFRAit  -- -- 0.048110 1.467778 
OPENit 0.366343 2.893695 -- -- 
REERit -0.007973 -2.956709 -0.010435 -3.847330 
1ity −  0.290731 3.383842 0.262849 3.241549 
TREND 0.047959 1.925138 -0.020232 -0.444408 
Constant Intercept -112.6775 -2.545672 15.53702 0.174554 
2R  0.912572  0.911485  
S.E. of regression 0.438523  0.441239  
RSS 46.92179  47.50481  
2nd Stage RSS 47.60568  46.45853  
Durbin-Watson 1.992991  1.996209  
Sargan Statistic 
(p-Value) 
10.542 
(0.0612) 
 
4.521 
(0.4771) 
 
Wu – Hausman Statistic 
(p-Value) 
0.0264  0.2476  
• t-ratios are based on White cross-section standard errors.  
• Country fixed effect estimates are not reported.  
• RSS is the sum of squared residuals.  
• The Sargan Statistic is the value of the GMM objective function at estimated parameters, 
asymptotically distributed as 2(5)χ  under the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid.   
• The Wu – Hausman Statistic is asymptotically distributed as 2(5)χ  under the null hypothesis that the 
effective tax rate is weakly exogenous.  
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Table 5: The impacts of social expenditure (x) and effective tax rate (z) 
on the inflow of FDI (y) in a sample of OECD countries  
Country ix  iz  
?
ˆ ˆi i
i
y z
x
α γ∂ = +
∂
 
?
ˆ ˆi i
i
y x
z
β γ∂ = +
∂
 
Testing the joint restriction 
0 & 0i ix zβ γ α γ+ = + =  
Australia 15.25 37.99 0.048281* (0.019814) 
-0.068060* 
(0.020624) 10.89279    (0.0043) 
Belgium 25.64 23.88 -0.004608 (0.013032) 
0.003765 
(0.005348) 0.566816    (0.7532) 
Canada 18.39 39.40 0.032297* (0.016572) 
-0.075238* 
(0.022664) 11.04437    (0.0040) 
Finland 27.44 27.73 -0.013771 (0.013418) 
-0.015833* 
(0.007002) 5.856913    (0.0535) 
France 27.34 28.52 -0.013262 (0.013382) 
-0.019855* 
(0.007834) 6.994879    (0.0303) 
Germany 23.83 28.78 0.004606 (0.013195) 
-0.021178* 
(0.008127) 6.822299    (0.0330) 
Greece 19.86 22.23 0.024814 (0.015313) 
-0.021178* 
(0.008127) 5.240592    (0.0728) 
Ireland 19.43 17.88 0.027003 (0.015660) 
0.034307* 
(0.011321) 9.354609    (0.0093) 
Italy 23.42 29.31 0.006693 (0.013308) 
-0.023876* 
(0.008746) 7.473605    (0.0238) 
Japan 12.09 37.25 0.064367* (0.023570) 
-0.064294* 
(0.019559) 10.80853    (0.0045) 
Netherlands 26.95 24.43 -0.011276 (0.013260) 
0.000965 
(0.005243) 0.729023    (0.6945) 
N. Zealand 20.60 43.09 0.021047 (0.014762) 
-0.094021* 
(0.028047) 11.28647    (0.0035) 
Portugal 15.16 33.08 0.048739 * (0.019915) 
-0.043067* 
(0.013670) 9.974157    (0.0068) 
Spain 19.48 33.59 0.026749 (0.015619) 
-0.045663* 
(0.014375) 10.09218    (0.0064) 
Sweden 32.18 21.11 -0.037899* (0.016608) 
0.017865* 
(0.007394) 7.351023    (0.0253) 
Switzerland 21.65 25.89 0.015703 (0.014092) 
-0.006467 
(0.005572) 2.096539    (0.3505) 
UK 23.19 25.77 0.007863 (0.013383) 
-0.005856 
(0.00551) 1.287925    (0.5252) 
USA 14.11 28.84 0.054084* (0.021124) 
-0.021483* 
(0.008195) 8.126623    (0.0172) 
Full Sample  21.45 29.38 0.054084* (0.021124) 
-0.024232* 
(0.008830) 7.546543    (0.0230) 
The results are based on the estimates of Model 1 reported in Table 2. The numbers in parentheses below the 
estimates are the corresponding asymptotic standard errors which can be used to test the restrictions 0ixβ γ+ =  
and 0izα γ+ =  – asterisks denote significant at 5%. For testing the latter restrictions jointly, we report the value of 
the Wald 
2
(2)χ  test statistic in the last column, with the corresponding p-values in parenthesis.  
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Data Appendix 
Variable Notation Description Source 
FDI inflows y  FDI International Direct 
Investment Statistics 
Yearbook 2001, OECD 
Social 
Expenditure 
x Total public social expenditure by 
country as percentage of GDP 
Social Expenditure Database, 
2001 edition, OECD 
Effective tax 
rate 
z effective marginal tax rate on 
investment calculated as difference 
between cost of capital and post-tax rate 
of return as a proportion of cost of 
capital 
OECD (2003) 
GDP GDP GDP in real 1996 USD OECD (2003) 
Population POP  World development 
indicators database, World 
Bank 
Openness 
indicator 
OPEN (Imports + Exports) / GDP World development 
indicators database, World 
Bank 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
REER Nominal effective exchange rate (a 
measure of the value of a currency 
against a weighted average of several 
foreign currencies) divided by a price 
deflator or index of costs 
World development 
indicators database, World 
Bank 
Government 
consumption 
GC General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
World development 
indicators database, World 
Bank 
Inflation rate INFL Percent change in consumer prices World development 
indicators database, World 
Bank 
Unit labour 
cost 
ULC Trade-weighted unit labour cost in 
manufacturing 
OECD (2003) 
Cost of capital CC The required pre-tax rate of return for 
investment in the country based on the 
approach developed in King and 
Fullerton (1984) 
OECD (2003) 
Infrastructure  INFRA Indicator on quality and quantity of 
telecom, transport and electricity 
infrastructure, relative to US 1995 = 
100 
OECD (2003) 
Index of left 
political party 
LEFTC Left party cabinet portfolios as 
percentage of all cabinet portfolios 
Duane, Swank, "Codebook 
for 21-Nation Pooled Time-
Series Data Set: Political 
Strength of Political Parties 
by Ideological Group in 
Capitalist Democracies," 
http://www.marquette.edu/pol
isci/Swank.htm (accessed 4 
January 2007) 
 
